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In early May, the Guatemalan government and the guerrilla umbrella organization Unidad
Revolucionara Nacional Guatemalteca (URNG) finally signed an agreement on socioeconomic
issues and agrarian affairs, which was under negotiation for more than a year. The accord calls
for substantial changes in government policies and a comprehensive model for development that,
if implemented, could bring significant benefits to the country's poor majority. Still, campesino,
labor, and grassroots groups criticize the agreement for avoiding structural reforms in Guatemala,
particularly in the agricultural sector.
In addition, most opposition organizations fear that much of the accord's specific commitments will
go unfulfilled since implementation is largely left up to the "good will" of the government and the
private sector. Notwithstanding the criticisms, however, the signing of the accord has propelled
the peace process forward, and nearly all sides now believe that a final agreement will be reached
before the end of the year. In fact, on June 7-8, the government and the URNG are scheduled to
begin discussion of measures to fortify civilian power and redefine the army's role in the country,
the last substantial item on the negotiating agenda. Sweeping commitments contained in new
accord On May 6, the government's negotiating commission (Comision por la Paz, COPAZ) and the
URNG finally signed the long-awaited socioeconomic and agrarian agreement, which they began
negotiating in March 1995 under ex-president Ramiro de Leon's government.
The accord is the fifth pact to be reached since the peace process was reinitiated in January 1994.
The other four agreements include a comprehensive accord on human rights, a pact to ensure the
safe return of refugees in Mexico and elsewhere, an accord on the rights of indigenous peoples of
Guatemala, and a pact authorizing the establishment of a war-crimes commission to investigate
abuses committed by both sides during the 36-year war (see NotiSur, 03/03/95 and 04/07/95).
Although negotiations on socioeconomic reforms continued throughout 1995, little progress was
achieved last year because of opposition from recalcitrant members of the private sector, and
because the government and the rebels were reluctant to sign new agreements until after the
November 1995 general elections (see NotiSur, 03/15/96).
After President Alvaro Arzu took office in January, however, the peace process gained new force,
largely because of energetic efforts by the incoming government to demonstrate its will to negotiate
accords in good faith and to abide by commitments (see NotiSur, 04/12/96). The May agreement
outlines measures that obligate the government to reorient and reorganize state policies governing
social, economic, and agrarian programs. Taken together, the commitments constitute a new
framework for development in Guatemala that emphasizes an improvement in the standard of
living of the poor majority through a more equitable distribution of the country's wealth and
the benefits of economic growth. The accord is divided into four broad sections: democratic
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participation in development programs; social- development policies; the agrarian situation and
rural development; and modernization of public administration and fiscal policy.
Following is an overview of the most important commitments contained in each section:

1. Democratic participation
The pact calls for strengthening institutional mechanisms at all levels to allow the population to
have a direct say in the design and implementation of development programs. Measures must be
enacted, including some legal reforms, to "decentralize" decision-making and allow for the transfer
of adequate resources to municipalities and local communities. Specific measures include the
reinvigoration and, in some cases, legal reactivation of "urban and rural development councils,"
which will function around the country to provide community input beginning at the village level
and continuing to the national level; legal reforms to allow departmental development councils
to have a direct say in presidential appointments of departmental governors; and legal reforms to
protect the rights of women and pave the way for their direct participation in decisions at all levels,
including measures to give women adequate access to education, housing, health services, and
equal employment opportunities.

2. Social-development policy
The text of the pact emphasizes that the state has an "undeniable obligation" to correct social
inequities, and that it must implement appropriate development policies and invest enough public
funds to allow for "universal access" to basic social services. To achieve those goals, the accord
commits the government to design and implement strategies that will allow the GDP to grow at an
average annual rate of no less than 6% to generate the wealth necessary to satisfy basic needs. It also
obligates the government to prioritize spending on health, nutrition, education, worker training,
housing, environmental sanitation, and employment promotion. According to the pact, by the year
2000 the government must increase the level that the state spends on health and education as a
percent of GDP by 50% compared with 1995. In education, the government must carry out a broad
literacy campaign in both Spanish and indigenous languages that will increase the literacy rate to
70% of the population, and it must ensure that, by the year 2000, all children receive a minimum
of three years of schooling. In health, the government promises to prioritize prevention programs.
By the year 2000, the state must channel 50% of all health expenditures into preventive efforts, and
by that same year the government must have reduced infant and maternal mortality rates by 50%
compared with 1995. Among other things, the pact also commits the government to a comprehensive
housing-development program. Starting in 1997, at least 1.5% of the state budget must be spent
on housing construction, with priority given to low-income homes. And, regarding employment
opportunities, by the year 2000 the government must have provided direct training and placement
services for at least 200,000 workers.

3. Agrarian situation and rural development
Regarding land tenure, the government promised to create a national "land bank" (Fondo de
Tierras) to provide landless campesinos with access to land and to make adequate credit available
to farm the parcels they receive, either individually or in cooperatives. The government will
accumulate land for the land bank through a variety of means. Some of the methods include use
of public lands for the program; legal confiscation of lands in some northern regions that were
distributed to wealthy individuals through corrupt means by former military governments; state
©2011 The University of New Mexico,
Latin American & Iberian Institute
All rights reserved.

Page 2 of 6

LADB Article Id: 55637
ISSN: 1060-4189

purchase of lands on the open market using public funds and by contracting special loans from
international lending institutions; use of lands donated to the program by foreign governments
and organizations; and, expropriation of fallow lands, which is permitted in some cases by the
Constitution. The government must also approve legal reforms that will speed the process of
land titling for campesinos and permit the rapid resolution of land disputes. An "agrarian court"
will be created within the judiciary devoted solely to resolving land conflicts. In addition, the
government will reform the laws that pertain to fallow or underutilized lands to bring them into
production. In 1997, the government will initiate a new land registry to assess current land-tenure
patterns and to determine the quantity of fallow or underutilized land. The registry will provide a
statistical basis for government efforts to maximize the productive use of farms. In fact, to finance
the state's agricultural programs and to discourage owners from underutilizing their properties the
government will impose a new, progressive tax on all rural lands, and it will greatly increase the
current tax rates for fallow lands.

Modernization of public administration and fiscal policy
The pact commits the government to enact legal reforms to decentralize public administration
and make government services more efficient. It also obligates the government to abide by the
investment priorities outlined in the social-development section of the accord. Finally, the pact calls
for measures to greatly increase tax income while making the tax system more just. Among other
things, the government will escalate its efforts to crack down on tax evasion. It will approve much
stricter penalties for tax evaders, and it will impose "exemplary sanctions" against individuals found
guilty of tax fraud. All told, by the year 2000, the government must double the level of tax income as
a percentage of GDP compared with the amount collected in 1995. That means that, at a minimum,
tax revenue must grow to about 12% or 13% of GDP. Accord provokes mixed reactions
The pact which was signed in Mexico in a ceremony that included diplomatic representatives from
the US, Latin America, Europe, and the UN provoked a wide range of reactions. Not surprisingly,
government officials and the URNG hailed the accord as a major breakthrough that could permit
fundamental economic and social progress in Guatemala for the first time. "This agreement will
contribute greatly to the development of our country," said President Arzu in a televised address
to the nation after the signing ceremony. "It will contribute to the re-establishment of peace, social
harmony, economic progress, and a future with dignity for Guatemalans. It will open the door for
our country to be reincorporated into the global community of democratic nations because the world
will see us again as a civilized nation that is struggling to progress."
Although more tempered in their statements, URNG leaders stressed that, if the accord is
adequately implemented, it represents a fundamental break from past models of economic
development that will allow substantial strides forward in attacking poverty and inequality, which
the rebels consider the root causes of the war. According to rebel leaders, although the pact does
not call for radical structural reforms, it does outline a process of economic modernization that,
once begun, can be broadened and improved through political and social struggle. "This accord is
not a complete solution to the country's economic and social problems, which are what gave rise to
the war in the first place," said Pablo Monsanto, head of the Fuerzas Armadas Rebeldes, the oldest
of the four guerrilla organizations that make up the URNG. "But it opens up new paths for their
resolution and it establishes firm commitments. The accord represents a point of departure that
must be built up with the participation of all social sectors."
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According to Gaspar Llom, head of the Organizacion del Pueblo en Armas (ORPA), the accord
must be seen as a "first step," one which reflects an objective understanding of what is realistically
possible under current political conditions. In the agrarian section, for example, Llom stressed that,
although there is no call for an "agrarian reform" which was a central rebel demand during most
of the 36-year guerrilla war there are measures that will lead to the "modernization" of land tenure
and agricultural development, bringing substantial benefits to poor campesinos. "We have opted
for agrarian modernization as opposed to agrarian reform," said Lllom. "But even modernization
will greatly improve and protect the standard of living of campesinos." Nevertheless, reactions by
campesino, labor, and grassroots organizations have been very critical, precisely because the accord
does not call for structural reforms.
The Asamblea de la Sociedad Civil (ASC), for example, complained that its viewpoints were
not taken into account in the accord, since ASC proposals presented to government and
URNG representatives during the negotiations specifically called for much broader reforms,
especially regarding agricultural policies. The ASC was set up in 1994 as a vehicle through which
nongovernmental and civilian groups debate their views on the agenda items under negotiation in
peace talks. The ASC then presents consensus positions on the issues to both sides at the bargaining
table. ASC directors have so far refused to officially endorse the accord. Rather, the ASC is calling
for a "high-level commission" to be set up to review the pact to determine if it adequately reflects
the will of organized social sectors in Guatemala. Campesino groups have been even more critical of
the accord than the ASC.
The country's largest campesino organizations grouped in the Coordinadora Nacional de
Organizaciones Campesinas (CNOC) launched a nationwide campaign of land invasions in 1995
to press for the resolution of land conflicts and for implementation of a comprehensive agrarian
reform. The land invasions have continued throughout the first half of this year (see Chronicle of
Latin American Economic Affairs, 05/02/96). "The accord includes minimal commitments that do not
satisfy the demands of the Mayan people and campesinos," reads a statement by the Coordinadora
Nacional Indigena y Campesina (CONIC), one of CNOC's largest and most active groups. "The
accord does not take into account our positions and it was negotiated behind our backs."
According to CONIC leader Juan Tiney, land invasions will continue around the country because,
even if the accord helps alleviate some problems through agrarian modernization, it will not resolve
the basic conditions of poverty in the countryside. "The accord has gaping holes that are very
concerning," said Tiney. "The promise to establish a land bank is confusing, since the vast majority
of lands are already concentrated in the hands of large owners and it is difficult to understand
how they will accumulate enough property in the land bank to satisfy the needs of campesinos. A
structural solution to the agrarian problem must be initiated immediately, since more than four
million Indians and campesinos are living in extreme poverty."
In addition to the lack of structural reforms in the accord, grassroots organizations fear that even
the commitments that are contained in the pact may not be fulfilled because implementation is, for
the most part, left to the "good will" of the government and the country's economically powerful
groups. Opposition groups fear, for example, that the promise to compile a comprehensive land
©2011 The University of New Mexico,
Latin American & Iberian Institute
All rights reserved.

Page 4 of 6

LADB Article Id: 55637
ISSN: 1060-4189

registry may never be completed because the country may not have the technical capacity for the
study, which some economists estimate will cost a minimum of US$100 million and take at least
five years to compile. In contrast to the concerns of campesino and grassroots groups, the private
sector has strongly supported the accord. "We believe the accord represents a very positive attempt
to establish functional development policies," said Humberto Preti, president of the business
umbrella organization Comite Coordinador de Asociaciones Comerciales, Agricolas, Industriales,
y Financieras (CACIF). "Clearly the two sides avoided any inclusion of ideological positions in the
document. We think it's a good accord that sends positive messages."
In fact, CACIF's hearty embrace of the pact may be flaming concerns among grassroots groups
about the accord, since recalcitrant members of the private sector especially landowners adamantly
opposed fundamental concessions at the bargaining table on land and tax issues, which contributed
to the slow progress of negotiations in 1995. Still, notwithstanding the ASC and campesino concerns,
the signing of the pact was hailed by nearly all sides as a major step forward in the peace process
that makes a final end to the war extremely likely this year. "The signing of this accord represents
a confirmation that the peace process in Guatemala is irreversible," said Marrack Goulding, UN
undersecretary general who attended the signing ceremony in Mexico. "Such an accord would have
been unthinkable just a few years ago."
The government is pushing for the remaining agenda items to be concluded in time to sign a
final accord by Sept. 15, Independence Day in Central America. The September target may not
be possible, but UN representatives mediating the talks say that all sides expect a final peace
agreement no later than December of this year. Indeed, September may be unrealistic given that the
current agenda item now on the bargaining table measures to fortify civilian power and redefine the
army's role in the country may well snag over the discussion of military reforms and related issues.
The URNG and government representatives opened a new round of negotiations over that issue on
June 7. The ASC is calling for a sweeping overhaul of the armed forces that would fundamentally
alter the military's role in the country. The army, on the other hand, wants to limit the changes to
administrative reorganization, troop reductions, and reorientation of policies in concordance with
peacetime conditions, although the army would accept some important reforms, such as eliminating
the jurisdiction of military tribunals for criminal cases that involve army personnel.
For its part, the URNG will apparently insist on some far-reaching reforms, such as a constitutional
redefinition of the army's role to prohibit that institution from participating in domestic-security
affairs in the future. The URNG also wants an ad hoc commission to be set up to review the records
of current military officers as a basis to purge army ranks of individuals responsible for serious
human rights violations or acts of corruption. Another point of dissention is the possibility of an
amnesty decree for former rebels and army personnel, which grassroots organizations closely
following the talks say has been informally discussed by both sides in recent weeks. [Sources:
La Jornada (Mexico), 05/07/96; Agencia Centroamericana de Noticias-Spanish news service EFE,
03/30/96, 04/01/96, 04/11-13/96, 04/15/96, 05/01/96, 05/03- 08/96; Notimex, 05/12/96, 05/16/96; Reuter,
04/25/96, 04/30/96, 05/03/96, 06/06/96, 05/08/96, 05/23/96; Deutche Press Agentur, 04/12/96, 05/24/96;
Inforpress Centroamericana (Guatemala), 03/28/96, 04/11/96, 04/25/96, 05/09/96, 05/16/96, 05/30/96;
Inter Press Service, 04/26/96, 04/27/96, 05/06/96, 05/08/96, 05/17/96, 05/29-31/96; Agence France©2011 The University of New Mexico,
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Presse, 03/26/96, 04/10/96, 04/11/96, 04/16/96, 04/25/96, 05/01/96, 05/02/96, 05/04/96, 05/06-09/96,
05/15/96, 05/20/96, 05/23/96, 05/26-29/96, 06/01/96, 06/03-05/96]

-- End --
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